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V 
HYPERVELOCITY IMPACT TESTING OF CABLES 
SUMMARY 
The hypervelocity impact tests were performed to gain information that can be used 
to evaluate the anticipated damage to cabling and cable-connected systems that are exposed 
to the meteoroid environment. 
The data from direct impacts have bracketed the failure point for certain type 
cables. The data for indirect impacts should be used with caution after reading this report. 
The following tabulation summarizes the results: 
Type 3 
Physical 
of Energy Necessary Energy Necessary of Failure 
End View Direct Impacts, Indirect Impacts, Description 
Cable Types for Failure (J) for Failure (J) Mode 
Conductor 
cable severed 
or broken 
Excessive 
845 to 1172 insulation 
stripped away 
8.64 to 11 .OO 
0.164 to 0.210 
2.03 to 2.62 
630 to 678 
Short of center 
conductor to 
ground shield 
Short of center 
conductor to 
ground shield 
Type 5 10.2 to 11.4 
Conductor 
severed or 
broken 
Physical 
End View Direct Impacts, Indirect Impacts, Description 
of Energy Necessary Energy Necessary of Failure 
Cable Types for Failure (J) for Failure (J) Mode 
2.68 to 5.68 
glass spheres 
(p  = 2.5 g/cm3) 
Type 7 0.0595-cm-diameter Conductor 
severed or 
broken 
INTRODUCTION 
Insulated cabling represents a fire hazard if it is contained inside the pressure wall of 
a spacecraft. Therefore, where possible, for Skylab and other spacecraft, all the cabling is 
placed outside the pressure wall. This location exposes the cables to the meteoroid 
environment. Most Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) cables are also exposed to direct and 
indirect meteoroid impacts. An indirect impact is one in which a meteoroid impacts a 
bumper or shield with sufficient energy to penetrate it and generate debris that will 
encounter the cabling behind this shield or bumper. A direct impact is one in which the 
meteoroid itself impacts the cabling. 
Very little information was available to assess the effects of this environment. 
Therefore, it was necessary to generate sufficient information to determine if additional 
cable protection was necessary to stay within the mission constraint probability. 
It was obvious that a complete definition of all the parameter relationships in the 
time available was impossible. Therefore, the approach was to select some given parameters 
and perform experiments to acquire basic data. To acquire the basic data, a mutual effort 
was established between Astronautics (ASTN), Astrionics (ASTR), and Space Sciences 
Laboratories (SSL) of MSFC. The electrical configuration, circuits, currents, etc., were 
determined by ASTR. The mass and impact probability of meteoroids to be simulated was 
determined by SSL and ASTN. The compilation, accumulation, and evaluation of the data 
were made by SSL and the Sperry Rand Corporation support personnel working for ASTR. 
n e  light gas-gun facility at SSL was used for the simulated impacts because of its unique 
capabilities. The information derived was sent to Clyde Nevins, ASTN, who is responsible 
for final recommendations affecting the Skylab meteoroid protection. 
1. PHYSICS 
The objective of the test series was to determine the ballistic limit or failure point 
for each type of cable tested. The ballistic limit or failure point was determined by 
2 
bracketlng; i.e., the parameter representing the potential damage capability of the impacting 
projectile was ranked in order from lowest to highest value. Then, moving from the low 
values, which did not cause failure, to the high values, which did cause failure, a bracket 
around the actual ballistic limit was established. 
The ballistic limit Was defined as the case where the cable failed to perform its 
proper function. There are two general ways in which this could occur: (1) if the cable was 
shorted to another conductor, and (2) if the cable were broken or severed. 
, 
The parameter used to represent the potential damage capability of the impacting 
projectile is the energy. Energy extrapolation is conservative, as shown in the following 
discussion. 
A. Energy Extrapolation Discussion 
The meteoroid environment model [ 1 , 21 is a meteoroid mass-flux curve given in 
terms of the number of meteoroids of mass (m) or greater that will impact 1 m2 /s versus the 
meteoroid mass (m). The data plotted are from Pegasus spacecraft, Explorer XVI and XXIII 
spacecraft, Gemini window evaluation, and photographic meteor observations. 
The velocity of a meteoroid of mass (m) is assumed to be 20 km/s. Its density is 
assumed to be 0.5 g/cm3. The laboratory simulation in this test series had an average 
velocity of 6 km/s using glass spheres of density 2.5 g/cm3. 
When a ballistic limit is established using laboratory techniques, how can the 
information be extrapolated with confidence to the meteoroid values? 
Reference 3 describes the tests used in calibrating the Pegasus and Explorer XXIII 
detection panels. These detectors were used to define the meteoroid environment model in 
References 1 and 2. In this publication, a well-established penetration formula is presented: 
T =  
where 
T = target thickness that will be penetrated (cm) 
0.8 16 K = target material constant = 
(E) 8(PT) 
p = projectile density 
m = projectile mass 
v = projectile velocity. 
E = ductility (percent elongation) 
PT = target density. 
3 
Assuming this formula is valid, two projectiles represent the same potential damage, 
as far as penetration is concerned, if 
P1 0.148 m10.352 v10.875 = p,0.148 m20.352 “,0.875 
by simple manipulation 
Substituting the laboratory and meteoroid values, the relationship, for this test 
series, between the laboratory mass (ml)  and its equivalent meteoroid mass (m,) is 
obtained : 
m2 = l / l O m l  
Assuming energy extrapolation is valid, two projectiles represent the same potential 
damage, if 
1 /2ml  v 1 2  = 1/2m2 v22 
Again, substituting the respective values yields 
m2 l /d l  ml 
Thus, it is seen that energy extrapolation for this test series is conservative. The 
tables are, therefore, presented in terms of energy for the convenience of the user. 
A more detailed description of the physical phenomena is of interest for .  
understanding the data obtained for predicting effects on other types of cables and is given 
in the following section. 
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B. Physical Phenomena of Hypervelocity impact 
Many complex events occur in a hypervelocity impact. Rather than discussing 
details, the explanation here will deal with basic concepts so that a general understanding 
can be developed. The details will be left to in-depth publications already available. 
One of the characteristics of a hypervelocity impact of two materials is that a shock 
wave will be generated at the interface and proceed into the respective materials with a 
velocity (D) equal to or faster than the sound velocity (C) in the material. The volume of 
material directly behind the shock wave iS compressed. The material in front is undis- 
turbed. 
- 
. 
The process can be described in two reference systems: (1) a system in which the 
undisturbed material is at rest and the compressed material is moving, or (2) a system in 
which the undisturbed material is moving and the compressed material is at rest. These two 
systems of reference are shown to be equivalent in Figure 1. VeIocities D and U have the 
same value in both systems; however, it should be noted that the velocity of the shock wave 
is defined differently in the two systems. This difference is because of the manner in 
which D is defined. It is defined’ as the velocity of the shock wave with respect to the 
undisturbed material. 
Since release wayes that travel at the sound velocity (C) of the material will be 
discussed, it should be noted that the sound velocity in the undisturbed material is not the 
same as the sound velocity in the compressed material. The release wave will always travel 
faster in the compressed material; therefore, an equation of state is necessary to define the 
desired parameters and velocities. Suffice it to say that the release waves releases the 
compressed material and is generated from a free surface and/or discontinuity. For the 
following discussion, assume that the released material is fragmented. 
Assume that an incompressible cylindrical projectile impacts a compressible target 
material and that the only free surface is the rear of the target. Figure 2A illustrates the 
process as a function of time. 
The scaling factors used in each illustration of Figure 2 are that: ( I )  material can be 
compressed to one-half its original volume, (2) the shock wave travels 2X for each time 
increment, and (3) the release wave travels 3X for each time increment. 
Reverse the situation in Figure 2A and assume that a compressible cylindrical 
projectile impacts an incompressible target. This time, the only free surfaces are the ends of 
the projectile. Remove the incompressible target after five time increments, as shown in 
Figure 2B. When this happens, the release wave will begin at the original interface between 
the two materials. The shock wave will proceed until the release wave overtakes and releases 
it. 
Combine these two processes, as in Figure 2C. In addition to both materials being 
compressible, both have an equal velocity toward each other, and the original interface is 
stationary. The process illustrates that when a traveling projectile impacts a material, the 
impact parameters and the ratio between the length of the projectile and the thickness of 
. 
5 
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Figure 2. Shocked material - Released material relationship for (a) compressible target, 
incompressible projectile; (b) incompressible target, compressible projectile; and 
(c) compressible target, projectile where the shock wave travels at 2X and 
the release wave travels at 3X. 
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the target material determine if the original projectile is totally fragmented or if part of it 
will proceed at its original velocity through a hole generated in the target by the impact 
phenomena. 
The fragmentation process can be understood by visualizing a group of billiard balls 
connected to each other by springs. A compressive force acting on the group will force them 
closer together, storiig energy in the springs. There is a point at which the restoring force 
will balance the compressive force. This state would be the compressed state of the group 
under the given force. When the compressive force is removed, the springs will turn the 
stored energy into kinetic energy and accelerate the balls toward the original equilibrium 
configuration. Depending on the energies involved and the strength of the springs, the end 
result would be any one of three conditions: (1) the group is restored, after some 
oscillation, to its original configuration, ( 2 )  some of the springs are stretched beyond their 
elastic limit and the group returns to its original configuration with some distortions, and/or 
(3) some springs are broken and the group is fragmented. 
This simple approach in describing the fragmentation phenomena has assumed that 
the fragmentation will be uniform; i.e., each “chunk” of debris will be the same, whereas in 
reality the debris particles vary in size and trajectory. The concept, however, will be useful 
in understanding what is taking place. 
Figures 3 and 4 are plots of the impact processes already discussed using parameters 
obtained from the equation of state for an aluminum-on-aluminum impact calculated by 
Naumann1[4] . These figures assume the stationary interface reference system where the 
target and projectile approach each other at equal velocities. The initial time (t = 0) is the 
moment of contact between the two materials. The time axis represents the stationary 
interface with the rear surface of the target and projectile approaching it as a function of 
time. 
The shock wave begins at the interface (0,O) and travels in both materials toward 
the approaching rear surfaces at an equal velocity. As the shock wave reaches the rear 
surface, the release wave is generated and travels in an opposite direction at a higher 
velocity. 
In Figure 3, the release wave does not overtake the shock wave in the projectile until 
the entire length of projectile is processed and, therefore, as illustrated in the pictorial 
representation at the bottom, the entire projectile is fragmented. 
In Figure 4, the release wave overtakes the shock wave in the projectile and releases 
it, allowing a piece of the projectile to continue at its original velocity through the hole 
generated in the target plate by the impact phenomena. 
This simplified explanation of the physical phenomena of hypervelocity impact does 
not contain an explanation for many complex interactions which occur; but it does present 
the concepts necessary in discussing some of the effects observed when the cables were 
examined. 
8 
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Figure 3. Aluminum on aluminum impact where the release wave does not 
overtake the shock wave until the projectile is completely processed. 
(Therefore, there is complete fragmentation of the projectile.) 
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Figure 4. Aluminum on aluminum impact where the release wave overtakes 
the shock wave before the projectile is completely processed. 
(Therefore, there is a part of the projectile which proceeds 
at the initial velocity through the hole created in the target.) 
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C. Explanation of Physical Examination of Impacted Cables 
Two types of impacts were investigated: direct and indirect. Direct impacts are those 
where projectiles of a knowr ;ize d velocity encounter the cables directly. Indirect 
impacts are those where projectiles of a known size and velocity impact a thin bumper 
material causing fragmentation, as discussed in the previous section. This indirect impact 
produces fragments or debris particles of unknown size and velocity which impact the 
cables. 
1. Direct Impacts. Tests on the unshielded cables type 1 had some common 
characteristics. The impact shocked the insulation material. The free surfaces allowed the 
total release wave to separate part of this material from the inner conductor and the rest of 
the insulation material. The result was that an area of the cabling was left with no insulating 
material to protect the conductor from exposure. In many cases, additional damage to the 
inner conductor was done by the part of the projectile that was not fragmented passing 
through this vacated area and encountering the metal strands. 
All impacts were in the hypervelocity region; therefore, a plasma was created. 
When the impact affected only one wire, no shorting was monitored because there was no 
completed circuit path. However, when the impact affected two adjacent wires of different 
potential, a short would originate and continue until the plasma dissipated, at which time 
the short would terminate. It was found that the typical length of time for this type of short 
was 10 to 50 D S .  
Shorts of this duration were not considered failures. Therefore, the size of the 
particles was increased until the wires were actually severed. This, of course, made the wires 
incapable of performing their normal function and was considered a failure. Typical 
examples of these impacts are shown in Figure 5 .  
Tests on the single shielded wire type 2 had characteristics that were different 
from the unshielded wire. In this case, the impact removed insulation as before, but all of 
the shorts monitored were at least IOOOps in duration. Obviously, the plasma would 
generate a short of the same duration as before, and possibly longer, because of the smaller 
distance between the conductor and the grounded shield, but it would not generate a short 
two orders of magnitude longer. Therefore, the longer duration shorts need a different 
explanation. 
It was found that the impact phenomena caused strands of the shielding to 
break and bend inward toward the center conductor. There was evidence of burning or 
arcing; consequently, this indicates that the impact phenomena caused broken strands of the 
shield to come in contact with the inner conductor and remain shorted until this path was 
burned free. This process could last for several hundreds of microseconds. It was concluded 
that this would explain the observed characteristics. In this case, a projectile needed to 
impact only one cable to fail because the path could be completed to ground through the 
shield on the same wire. Typical examples are shown in Figure 6. 
Tests on the overall-shielded cables type 3 showed characteristics similar to 
the individually shielded cables; therefore, the explanation is essentially the same. 
11 
TYPE 1 
DIRECT IMPACTS INDIRECT IMPACTS 
Figure 5. Typical impacts on cable type 1. 
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TYPE 2 
DIRECT IMPACTS INDIRECT IMPACTS 
Figure 6. Typical impacts on cable type 2. 
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Examination of the coaxial cable type 5 showed evidence that the strands of 
shielding, broken during impact of this cable, bent outward away from the center 
conductor. In this series, failure was the breaking or severing of the conductor rather than 
shorting to the ground shield. 
The only difference, other than size, between types 2 and 5 is the extra 
’ insulation on the outside of the grounding shield on type 2 cable. It is, therefore, concluded 
that when the ground shield is confined or externally constrained from outward motion, it 
. will be forced through the insulation and short to the inner conductor. When it is 
unconstrained, the initial process will be the same; i.e., the initial impact process severs the 
strand and forces it toward the inner conductor. However, as the impact proceeds, a portion 
of the insulation is turned into a plasma whose expansion will reverse the motion of the 
brbken strand and bend it outward as it is found in the final state. 
This theory is further substantiated by the description of failure for cable 
type 2 in Section 111: “Physical damage to cables may be misleading since a shielded cable 
hit by small size pellets appears to be perfect except for a few minor pinholes. However, 
four shorts were found between shield and wire when tested.” 
The 32-conductor flat cable failed when one of the conductors was severed. 
The ballistic limit is defined in terms of energy; however, it was found that there was an 
obvious dependence on size or area of contact. Therefore, the size of the glass spheres is also 
given on the summary sheet. Typical impacts on cable types 3, 5, and 7 are shown in 
Figure 7. 
2. Indirect Impacts. The indirect impacts are quite different from the direct 
impacts. In this case, a projectile of a known size and velocity impacts a 0.064-cm (25-mil) 
thick aluminum sheet, simulating the Skylab bumper, which is located 12.7 cm (5 in.) in 
front of the cabling. Debris particles or fragments of an unknown size, phase, distribution, 
and velocity are created. The debris particles travel toward and encounter the cabling. 
Solid debris particles traveling in the hypervelocity range will damage the 
cables, as previously described under direct impacts. Liquid and plasma debris will affect the 
cabling in a manner not specifically investigated in this study. The damage described for 
indirect impacts is a combination of all three types of debris. 
It is obvious from the examination of the cables used during these experiments 
that the number of impacting particles per unit area of cabling is greater, and the overall 
effect was that long sections of wire were exposed, rather than isolated areas as found on 
the direct impacts. 
Another general effect was evident. The wires that were affected by the debris 
cloud were separated from each other. The more damage to the wire, the further it was from 
a neighboring wire. This suggests that a large amount of plasma is generated. The expansion 
of the plasma causes the wire to isolate itself from nearby material. 
Since the size, phase, distribution, and velocity of the debris particles are 
unknown, data indicating that a cable did or did not fail on a givcn shot may not be 
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consistent with another shot in the same test series because of the phase and distribution of 
particles that impact. Therefore, the data may appear ambiguous merely on the basis of 
probability. There was not enough time to conduct enough tests to eliminate this ambiguity. 
It was concluded that a decision on the amount of insulation removed from the wires made 
by visual inspection would define the failure point. 
From this brief discussion, it should be apparent that the data on the indirect 
impacts may not be as reliable as the data on the direct impacts. Therefore, caution should 
. be exercised when using these values. 
3. Summary. The direct impacts of known particles at known velocities have 
bracketed the failure or break point of certain types,of cabling. 
The indirect impact data give “ballpark” figures for the failure or break point; 
but it should be remembered that the size, state, distribution, and velocities of the debris are 
not known and, therefore, a probability factor may be reflected. 
11.  ELECTRICAL ASPECTS 
This section describes the electrical circuits and tests used in micrometeoroid testing 
of electrical cables. Testing was conducted according to Appendix A with the following 
deviations. Test sequences 5 and 6, 13 through 15, and 17 and 18 were not performed since 
these test sequences only required using different size wire. It was determined that no new 
information could be obtained from performing these tests; however, it was decided that 
since flat cable and coaxial cable are different type cables, tests using these two cables 
should be performed. 
The cables used in these tests were representative of the majority of cables used on 
Skylab I. Cable type 1 was made of unshielded AWG 20 wire. Cable type 2 was made of 
single shielded AWG 20 wire. Cable type 3 was an overall shielded cable made of AWG 20 
wire. Cable type 5 was a coaxial cable RG-179. Cable type 7 was 32-conductor flat cable. 
Test specimen requirements such as lacing, cleaning, cable part numbers, mounting, 
etc., are found in Appendix A. 
A. Electrical Circuitry 
All circuits are basically the same as Figure 8, which is a detailed schematic of the 
test circuitry used. A description of this basic circuit is given, and only the essential 
differences in other test circuits are described. Figures 9 and 10 are simplified versions of 
Figure 8 with the appropriate cables used. 
Each circuit was designed to allow for the detection of shorts and opens when the 
test specimen was bombarded by particles. The cables were constructed to allow half of the 
wires to complete a 30-volt circuit and the other half to complete a 60-volt circuit, resulting 
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in a 30-volt difference to detect any shorts between wires. This was accomplished by using a 
large load bank, represented by terminals 1 through 13 in Figure 8, and by R1 in all other 
figures, and tapping off the desired voltage. The load bank also enabled the source to supply 
a large instantaneous current if and when the cables shorted. This is representative of the 
power supply used on Skylab I. In Figure 8, the current in each circuit was obtained by 
choosing appropriate value resistors, R1 and R3 in the 60-volt circuit and R2 and R4 in the 
1 30-volt circuit. In Figures 9 and 10, this resistance is represented by R2 and R3. Each circuit 
was monitored by an oscilloscope which was triggered externally by a photocell, just prior 
to the particle hitting the cable. The circuit breakers were used to protect the power supply 
. and electrical components. 
Figure 9, which was used to test type 1 cables, functions exactly as Figure 8 
describes. 
Figure 10 differs slightly in that the test specimens used with this circuit were single 
shielded and overall shielded wire cable. Therefore, if either circuit shorted to the shield, the 
current would have a direct path to ground through the shield. To observe this, a small 
shunt, R4, was placed in the shield-to-ground line to permit monitoring of the line with an 
oscilloscope. 
B. FactTest 
The purpose of this test was to determine the amount of damage caused by the 
micrometeoroid particles, and it was performed in two parts. 
First, a continuity check was performed by running 4 amperes of current through 
the test specimen. A continuity check was then performed by applying 500 volts between 
each wire and ground to determine if the resistance was less than 100 M a .  The fact machine 
printed out the discrepancies it found. 
When testing began with the fact machine, the cables were checked at 1000 volts to 
detect a short less than 50 M a .  This was changed beginning with test number 45 to agree 
with ATM wire specifications. 
C. Leakage Test 
The purpose of this test was to determine the amount of current required to open a 
short. The leakage tester is shown in Figure 11. Voltage was applied by the six-position 
switch. In the "off" position, if a direct short is present, the voltmeter will read the applied 
voltage. The switch was then varied through the six positions, putting a smaller value resistor 
in the circuit each time. All voltages were recorded. The voltage applied was increased until 
the short opened. A maximum of 45 volts can be applied to this circuit. 
20 
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D. Evaluation Test 
This test consisted of counting the number of strands broken or otherwise damaged 
in the wire to determine if sufficient damage resulted from the firings to impair the 
current-carrying capability of the wire. 
E. Conclusion 
The circuits and test results were extremely informative; however, before the results 
are analyzed, a few points require clarification. The breakpoint was picked between the 
highest energy at which no failure occurred and the lowest energy at which failure did 
occur. Failure is defined as shorts or opens. A wire is classified as open if it was completely 
severed. However, three types of shorts may result from micrometeoroid bombardment. 
The first type is a short caused by a particle hitting the cable. The shorted path is 
through the plasma and lasts until the plasma is dissipated. This type of short may cause an 
approximate 10- to 50-ys pulse, 
The second type of short is one that remains after the plasma has dissipated, but 
opens or burns itself off after a short period of time. This type of short may last 
approximately 1000 y s  or longer and is considered a failure since this period of time is of 
sufficient length that damage to electrical components may result. 
The third type is a permanent short which remains after the plasma has dissipated 
and does not bum itself open. 
For direct hits, it was determined that the data obtained were accurate; however, for 
indirect or bumper shots, the results were inconclusive. The reason for this was explained 
previously, and only the results obtained for direct hits are discussed in this section. Cable 
type 1 was classified as the least troublesome, and cable types 2 and 3 as the most 
problematic. 
Type 1 is an unshielded cable. A total of 20 test firings (simulated micrometeoroid 
shots) were made on sequence 1 , and 9 test firings on sequence 3. The energy required to 
break wires within the cable (breakpoint) was determined to lie between 8.64 and 11 .O 
joules. Since there were no shorts in this type of cable, no leakage tests were performed. An 
evaluation test was made on a few cables. It was found that a maximum of 40 percent of the 
strands in one wire were broken, but sufficient data were not accumulated to establish this 
as an average figure. Figure 12 depicts typical damage to cable type 1. 
Type 2 is a single-shielded wire cable. A total of 12 direct test firings, sequences 7 
and 9, were made on this cable. The test results indicate that the energy required to short 
conductors to shields lies between 0.1 64 and 0.21 0 joule. The leakage test revealed that for 
this type of cable, an average current of approximately 4.66 amperes is required to open a 
short between the shield and a conductor. Test number 38, however, had the following 
. results. The test cable (number 10) experienced many shorts, two of which required 
9amperes of current per short to be burned open. One short when opened became a 
d 
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Figure 12. Typical damage to cable type 1. 
high-resistance short of 82.9 M a .  It would be highly improbable that a short of this type, in 
normal Skylab operation, would ever be burned open. This was, however, the only case 
where this problem arose. The evaluation test revealed that a minimum amount of damage 
was done to the wire. An average of 20 percent of the strands in one wire were broken. 
Refer to Figure 13 for typical damage to cable type 2. The breakpoint of this cable was not 
determined. 
Type 3 is an overall shielded cable. Six test firings, sequences 11 and 12, were made 
on this cable. The energy required to short conductors to shields was found-to lie between 
2.03 and 2.62 joules. The leakage test results indicated that an average of 9 amperes of 
current was required to burn off a short to the shield. There were many cases, however, 
where the shorts were never opened, even when this amount of current remained on the 
wire for a period of 1 to 5 minutes. The evaluation test revealed that little damage was done 
to the wire. Only in one case was there excessive damage where 60 percent of the strands in 
one wire were broken. Figure 14 depicts typical damage to cable type 3. 
Type 5 is coaxial cable. A total of 10 test firings were made, and the breakpoint was 
determined to be between 10.2 and 11.4 joules of energy, very similar to that found for 
unshielded wire cable. The cables were subjected to an RF test before and after the test 
shots; no electrical characteristics of the cable changed appreciably, and the only failure 
observed was open wire. See Figure 15 for typical damage to cable type 5. 
23 
Figure 13. Typical damage to cable type 2. 
Figure 14. Typical damage to cable type 3. 
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Figure 15. Typical damage to coaxial cable type 5.  
Type 7 is flat cable. A total of 12 test firings were made, and the breakpoint was 
found to lie between 2.68 and 5.68 joules of energy. However, the breakpoint was also 
found to be dependent on the size and, to some degree, the location of the hit. If the 
micrometeoroid mass was approximately 1 X g, the conductor did not open. The 
conductor was penetrated but remained undamaged to the extent that the current- or 
signal-carrying capability of the wire was not impaired. If, however, the micrometeoroid 
mass was approximately 1 X g and hit the conductor dead center or a slight margin 
from the center, the conductor opened. Figure 16 depicts typical damage to cable type 7. 
The results described indicate that the shielded wire cables are significantly more 
sensitive to micrometeoroid bombardment than are unshielded wires. However, all cables 
can withstand a higher degree of damage than previously anticipated. 
It was found that for the unshielded wire cable, the common mode of failure was an 
open conductor resulting in the loss of that conductor within a cable. But mission-critical 
circuits are redundant; consequently, this is not catastrophic. However, for the shielded wire 
cables, the most common failure was one or more conductors shorting to the shield. For 
single-shielded wire cable, 4.66 amperes of current were required to open a short, and for 
overall shielded wire cable, 9 amperes of current were required. Since the shielded cables are 
almost always signal cables, the possibility of the short opening is remote. This could result 
in the mixing up of signals, possible grounding of circuitry, load changes, etc. 
25 
DAMAGE FROM 2.76 X g BEADS 
Figure 16. Typical damage to flat cable type 7. 
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Protection of all Skylab exposed cabling is extremely difficult; therefore, only 
mission-critical cables should be considered. Shielded cables are not generally 
mission-critical cables, and this problem is not as grave as previously determined. 
A worst-case analysis on exposed Skylab cabling is currently in progress, and only 
mission-critical cables are being considered, as exposed to the micrometeoroid environment. 
The results of the analysis will be completed by April 30, 1972, and made available from 
ASTN-ES. 
1 1 1 .  DATA 
For this investigation, 68 test firings and -12 calibration firings were made, and 10 
different sequences were tested. 
The tests are separated into two main categories: direct impact of projectiles on the 
cable, and indirect impacts with the cable behind a micrometeoroid bumper. The bumper 
was 0.064-cm (25-mil) thick aluminum, spaced 12.7 cm (5 in.) above the cable to simulate 
the OWS bumper. 
Each category was broken down as follows: 
a. Current-carrying cables and zero-curren t (no voltage) cables - The zero-current 
cables had no electrical connections during the firings, but were checked after the firings for 
shorts and opens. 
A number of the firings were made against two cables simultaneously, one a 
current-carrying cable and the other a zero-current cable. The number of firings was reduced 
by this technique; however, it was found that one cable received less hits than the other 
cable (see test 43 of sequence 3 for comparison). Refer to Section IV for explanation. 
b. Cable types - These cable types were as follows: (1) unshielded wire laced into a 
cable (type l) ,  (2) individually shielded wire laced into a cable (type 2), (3) unshielded laced 
wire covered with an overall shield and a protective heat shrink tubing (type 3), (4) coaxial 
cable RG-179 (type 5), and (5) 32-conductor flat cable (type 7). 
In the interpretation of test data, several uncontrollable variables must be 
considered: (1) number of pellets hitting the cable, (2) some pellets hitting the cable 
head-on and some hitting on the side of the cable, (3) more than one pellet hitting in 
approximately the same area, and (4) the arrangement of 30- and 60-volt coil wires in the 
cables. 
Actual micrometeoroids are expected to be singular hits rather than multiple 
hits. The test cables were designed to have 30- and 60-volt coil wires adjacent to each other; 
however, the possibility existed of having similar wires adjacent. 
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These data are not exactly comparable to data which might be obtained from 
testing with actual micrometeoroids. The tests were performed with glass beads, “Lexan” 
plastic cylinders, and syntactic foam cylinders with densities of 2.5, 1.25, and 0.7 g/cm” 
respectively, and at velocities between 4 and 8 km/s. The majority of micrometeoroids have 
approximate densities of 0.5 g/cm3 and velocities of about 20 km/s. 
A. Description 
The data from these firings consist of test data sheets, pictures of the cables after the 
firings, pictures of the oscilloscope traces, fact test data sheets, and leakage testldata. These 
data are available for review but are not attached. 
The test data sheets contain information identifying the firing and the cables used, 
plus resistance and voltage measurements made before and after the firings. These 
measurements assure that the cable was correctly wired before the firing and indicate 
broken wires and permanent shorts between coils. 
Pictures taken of the cables after the firings contain information on the location of 
hits, side or head-on, and the amount of damage to the cable. 
The oscilloscope used was a dual trace type which presents the 30- and 60-volt coil 
traces together on a picture and facilitates comparisons. 
Fact test printouts indicate all shorts and opens in the cable. 
Leakage test data sheets indicate the voltage and current required to burn open the 
short and its measured resistance. 
Appendix B discusses an interpretation of the oscilloscope pictures. 
Physical damage to cables may be misleading since a shielded cable hit by small 
pellets appears to be perfect except for a few minor pinholes. However, four shorts were 
found between shield and wire when tested. 
The fact tests of shielded wire sometimes indicate shorts between conductors as well 
as shorts between shield and wire. Indications of conductor shorts were found to be due to 
the electrical path through the shield. The fact tests of shielded wire cable in some cases 
showed shorts which disappeared between the fact and leakage tests. Two possible 
explanations are that the short may have been in the megohm region or that the short 
disappeared because of jarring during transportation between the two testers which were in 
different buildings. Some procedural changes were made during the tests as better methods 
were discovered. Firings were made at single cables during sequences 1 and 3, except for 
tests 23 and 43. Most of the later tests were made with two cables at one time. Cables were 
loosely fastened with tape to the backup plate during early firings, but were clamped rigidly 
to the plate in later firings. A second oscilloscope was added for observing the 30-volt coil 
for a longer period of time. This scope was later used to observe the voltage across a shunt 
which was placed in the shield to ground lead. 
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B. Conclusion 
Testing is needed to more accurately evaluate bumper debris damage to shielded 
wire cables. Some additional tests of overall shielded cables in the lower pellet energy area 
will permit better identification of the breakpoint. 
A summary of test data obtained is given in Tables 1,2,  and 3. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
A. Test Parameters 
1. Accelerators. The accelerator used for this test series was a two-stage, 
0.3175-cm (1/8-in.) light gas gun. Hydrogen was used to accelerate the projectile. The 
hidest  velocity obtained to date with this accelerator is 9.80 km/s. 
2. Range. The range has a free path approximately 6.0 m long. Three 
photomultiplier tubes and two photo FET transducers are stationed along this free flight 
path. The output signals of these five devices establish a time of flight from which the 
velocities are calculated. 
The tests were conducted with a range pressure of 10 mm of mercury, created 
by introducing argon into the range after the evacuation. This environment was necessary to 
allow the photomultiplier tubes and photo FET transducers to establish time of flight. 
3. Projectiles. The projectiles used for this test series were cylinders and glass 
spheres. The material used to make the cylinder was “Lexan,” which has a density of 
1.25 g/cm3, and syntactic foam which has a density of 0.7 g/cm3. The glass spheres have a 
density of 2.5 g/cm3. The cylinders were used for the indirect tests. 
The method of launching the glass spheres was similar to a shotgun in that the 
distribution of the spheres was concentrated toward the center. The “wad” used was a 
“Lexan” cylinder; therefore, placing the cables in a position where the concentration of 
spheres would hit was extremely difficult. A compromise was made to place one cable 
(inner cable) closest to the periphery of the “wad” damage area and the other cable (outer 
cable) on the outside of this inner cable. 
4. Targets. The targets are described in Section I1 and in Appendix A. 
B. Procedure 
Several tests were conducted for calibration to determine whether the argon gas, 
used for obtaining the desired velocity, or the acceleration gases would have any measurable 
effects; it was found that they had no effect. 
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Resistance and voltage measurements were recorded before and after each shot as 
described in the test procedure. An oscilloscope was used to monitor the voltage on each 
circuit during the impact event. The scope was triggered from the pulse of the third 
photomultiplier tube so that it would monitor the circuit approximately 50 to loops 
before the impact. The cables were then removed from the range and subjected to the tests 
as described in Section 111, Data. 
A photograph of the complete test setup is shown in Figure 17. 
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APPENDIX A. MICROMETEOROID TEST PROCEDURE 
1. Purpose 
This document establishes the procedure for micrometeoroid testing of typical 
exposed Skylab cabling and harness assemblies. 
2. Objective 
The objective is to determine the energy levels of micrometeoroids that may cause 
cable failures during the Skylab Mission. Because of the lack of test facilities with a 
capability to actually simulate space conditions (lightweight micrometeoroids at average 
speeds of 20 km/s), data must be obtained at less stringent conditions, and predictions or 
extrapolations must be made. 
3. Test Specimen Requirements 
a. General Requirements. The test specimens will be representative Skylab cable 
types. The following general notes will apply: 
1. Wire Specifications - All unshielded wire will conform to 
MSFC-SPEC-40M395 13/5. All shielded wire will conform to MSFC-SPEC-40M39526A/5. 
2. Twisted Wires - Where wires are to be twisted, there will be a minimum of 
2.44 twists (transpositions) per meter (8 twists per foot), or a maximum lay of 7.62 cm 
(3 in.). 
3. Lacing - Wires will lay as straight as practical in the cable harness and lacing 
will conform to Style A of MSFC-STD-40M39582. 
4. Shields - Shields will be terminated per Standard MSFC-STD-40M39582, 
Class 5 .  All shields will be insulated from each other and the vehicle skin. Heat reactive 
tubing per MSFC-SPEC-276B, Type 11, Class 1A may be used if necessary. 
5 .  Contacts - Contacts will be installed and crimped per MSClMSFC JD-001, 
dated February 16, 1966. 
6. Cleaning - Cables will be wiped clean by using a lint-free cloth or sponge 
and isopropyl alcohol as required. After cleaning, cables will be blown dry with clean, dry 
air. Cables will not be submerged in alcohol. 
b. Specific Requirements. Five types of cables will be considered as test specimens. 
Priority will be given to  the testing of cable types 1 and 2. Other cable types will be tested 
as time and scheduling permits: 
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1. Cable Type 1 - Unshielded wire type V6N20NY wire electrical insulation 
Type V20 AWG 40M395 13A/5. Connector and overall configuration will be as indicated in 
Figure A-2. 
2. Cable Type 2 - Shielded wire type V6N20NlNB, wire electrical insulation 
type V20 AWG 40M39526A/5. Connector and overall configuration will be as indicated in 
Figure A-2. 
3. Cable Type 3 - Wire type V6N20NY wire electrical insulation type V20 
AWG 40M395 13A/5 with overall shield. Connector and overall configurat'ion will be as 
indicated in Figure A-3. 
4. Cable Type 4 - Unshielded wire type V6N16N wire electrical insulation 
Type V16 AWG 40M395 13A/5. Connector and overall configuration will be as indicated in 
Figure A-4. 
5. Cable Type 5 - Coaxial cable type RG 179B/U per MIL-C-17D. Connector 
6. Cable Type 6 - Unshielded wire type V6N12N wire electrical insulaiion. 
Type VI 2 AWG 40M395 13A/5. Connector and overall configuration will be as indicated in 
Figure A-6. 
and overall configuration will be as indicated in Figure A-5. 
7. Cable Type 7 - 32-conductor flat cable. 
4. Test Preparation and Descriptions 
a. Test Flow Plan. Priority will be given to testing cable types 1 and 2. Other cable 
types will be tested as time and scheduling permits. The test flow plan is given in Table A-1 . 
The number of test specimens selected is based on making predictions as indicated in 
Paragraph 2 above. If the decision is made to extrapolate, many more test specimens and 
test firings (see Paragraph e below) may be required. 
b. Test Specimen Identification. Prior to testing each test specimen will be 
identified with a tag that will accompany the specimen throughout testing. The tag will 
properly identify the test specimen and will summarize fact test results (see Paragraph f .  
below). If a test specimen is used (hit by micrometeoroid firing) more than once, the 
specimen damage will be identified according to test firing. 
c. Mounting Considerations. Each test specimen will be rigidly mounted on a test 
fixture prior to testing. The specimen will retain that configuration throughout the test 
sequence. If the after impact fact test indicates no failures, the test specimen may be 
removed from the plate and used in another test firing. A surface that has not been fired 
upon will be used for the second firing. 
d. Test Data Sheets. An example test data sheet is given later in this appendix. All 
entries that are applicable to the test will be made during testing. A test data sheet will be 
required for each test specimep in each test firing. 
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e. Test Firings. The actual hitting of the test specimens with a simulated 
micrometeoroid (projectile) is a test firing. The test firing will utilize a light gas gun to fire 
projectiles of known size and density. The velocity of the projectiles will be determined by 
monitoring photocells along the tube of the light gas gun. The test specimen (target) will be 
placed in a vacuum chamber at the end of the tube. One photocell will be used to trigger 
oscilloscopes so that test specimen events may be recorded during impact and short duration 
thereafter. 
f. Fact Test. After specimens have been mounted, a fact test will be performed 
before and after the test firing. The fact test will check for continuity of conductors and 
dielectric strength between mutually insulated conductors (shields included). 
1. Continuity Check. Each conductor within the test specimen will be checked 
for continuity with not more than 4 amps flowing for not more than 30-s duration. Failures 
will be recorded. 
2. Dielectric Check. The insulation of each test specimen will be tested 
between mutually insulated conductors (shields included) with 500 Vdc to detect less than 
100 M a .  Failures will be recorded. 
g. Leakage Test. If the fact test after a test firing indicates that wires are shorted 
(shields included), a leakage test will be conducted to determine if the test specimen is 
sufficiently damaged to degrade the Skylab Mission. The leakage test will be conducted as 
indicated in Figure A-1 1. The power supply will be set to 28 Vdc with the switch in the 
"off" position. (At this time, the meter will read the applied voltage if a direct short is 
present.) The switch will be rotated through the six positions and any indicated voltage on 
the voltmeter will be recorded. Any voltage greater than 0.09 volt will constitute a failure. If 
no voltage is indicated, the procedure will be repeated with the power supply set to 32 Vdc. 
If the short remains, additional tests may be performed by the test engineers. 
h. Test Evaluation. A test specimen that does not pass the leakage test after a test 
firing will be considered a failure. The test specimen will then be checked for broken or 
damaged strands. A change of state of any relay in test sequences 5 and 6 caused by a test 
firing will be considered a failure. The minimum energy level at which a failure occurs will 
be considered the ballistic limit of a cable type for evaluation purposes. 
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MICROMETEOROID CABLE TEST DATA SHEET 
POWER 
SWPLY 
TEST SAMPLE: NO. OF TEST: 
DATE: SSL CODE: 
TIME: CABLE FINE NO.: 
TEST CIRCUIT 
VOLTAGE/RESISTANCE TERMINAL 
TYPE TEST 
POWER CABLE CURRENT 0 SIGNAL CABLE R E L A Y 0  
I7 CABLE NO CURRENT 
AFTER 
0 INDIRECT HIT 
INSULATION TEST: BEFORE 
CHAMBER VACUUM: TEST CIRCUIT DESIGN 
METEORS: VELOCITY DIMENSIONS 
DENSITY MATERIAL 
VOLT AMP RES VOLT 
SCOPE SETTING 
TRIGGER SWEEP TIME: TRIGGER POSITION: 
AMPLITUDE VOLT/CM : TRIGGER SET: n 
RES VOLT RES VOLT RES 
DCVOLTSELECTION: I I 
B 
E 
F 
0 
R 
E 
A 
F 
T 
E 
R 
1
CAMERA LENS OPEN: 
U U 
I 1-3 I 1-7 I 2-4 I 2-7 I 3-7 I 4-7 I 
VOLT RES 
~ 
VOLT RES 
~ 
RELAY CIRCUIT TEST DATA 
REMARKS: 
NOTE: L1 will be on until K1 is set which 
is the normal circuit condition. 
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TEST DATA SHEET 
(Cable Sample) 
LEAKAGE TEST DATE: 
CABLE NO: 
TEST NO: 
SHORTED PINS: 
TYPE OF SHORT: HIGH R E S 0  DIRECT 0 
n VOLTAGE SETTING n 
28 Vdc 
5 
6 
(REF. Figure A-1 1 of Test Procedure) 
REMARKS: 
ADDITIONAL LOAD TESTS 
EVALUATION TEST 
REMARKS: 
REMARKS 
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APPENDIX 6. READING OSCILLOSCOPE PICTURES 
The following chart indicates the direction of movement of the oscilloscope traces 
under different conditions and refers to representative pictures. 
Condition 
Short between 30 & 60 V coils 
Short between 30 V coil and 
ground or shield 
Short between 60 V coil and 
ground or shield 
Broken wire in 30 V coil 
Broken wire in 60 V coil 
Note: Not all traces are clean 
Oscilloi 
30 V 
UP 
down 
No change 
down 
No change 
ope Traces 
60 V 
down 
slightly down 
down 
No change 
down 
~ 
Representative 
Pictures 
Test No. 3 
Test No. 45 
Test 
Test No. 16. 
Test No. 52 
both 30 V & 60 V broken 
.irect current pulses. Some are mixed with heavy oscillations. 
Combinations of the above conditions produce a combination of the results. 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812, October 5, 1972 
964-50-00-0000 
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